From minerals to missions: Europe's military AI imperative

On 18 September, CNN reported that US forces had prepared to intercept a Chinese vessel earlier this year after AI-assisted intelligence falsely identified its cargo as nuclear weapons programme components. At their 15–16 October meeting, EU leaders should launch a joint programme securing the entire AI value chain, from critical materials to tested military applications, through coordinated investment and common procurement, so that European forces can use reliable AI and sustain it independently.

Anthropic's 10 September report reinforces the urgency. It describes Claude's use in suspected Russian state-linked cyberespionage targeting Ukraine, weapons research by actors assessed as linked to China's defence sector, and drone-swarm software development by Russian-based freelancers. These findings do not establish that all these projects became operational military capabilities. They nevertheless show commercial AI entering both hostile operations and military development. Europe needs the ability to develop, verify and maintain its own systems.

Secure the material foundations

Europe has invested in supercomputers, semiconductor capacity and defence research. The Commission's June technology sovereignty package recognises the remaining gaps. Yet a European model running on imported processors, foreign-controlled software and vulnerable electricity supplies still leaves military readiness exposed. AI autonomy is a condition for strategic autonomy because external restrictions can determine whether European forces can operate and adapt their equipment.

That dependence begins underground. Rare earths support magnets in defence equipment; gallium and germanium matter for specialised electronics and sensors. Securing AI therefore requires attention to its wider industrial and energy foundations. China's mineral export restrictions already demonstrate how supply concentration can become strategic pressure. The European Court of Auditors found that efforts to diversify critical raw material imports for the energy transition had not delivered tangible results.

The Commission and participating governments should turn strategic mineral partnerships into long-term purchase commitments, supporting European and partner-country refining, recycling and component production. Guaranteed demand would help alternative suppliers attract capital despite higher initial costs, while competitive tenders would limit subsidies and protect taxpayers. Targeted stockpiles should bridge supply interruptions. During negotiations on Chips Act 2.0, legislators should prioritise defence-relevant gaps in chip design, manufacturing and advanced packaging. Funding should be tied to delivery milestones and verified supply resilience.

Turn computing into military capability

As EUISS analysis argues, fragmented digital infrastructure limits Europe's defence capabilities. The proposed Cloud and AI Development Act offers an opening to align civilian investment with defence requirements. Member States should commission accredited computing capacity for sensitive military workloads, backed by resilient electricity, protected communications and independently tested cybersecurity. Civilian computing expansion alone does not guarantee secure military access.

The European Defence Agency should assemble willing governments around common requirements and purchasing commitments, beginning with logistics, maintenance and intelligence analysis. Contracts should require interoperable data formats, access to the software and model components needed for maintenance, and enforceable rights to operate and update systems if a supplier withdraws. Ministries should agree rules for sharing releasable training and evaluation data, preserving national control over classified information. Smaller specialised models can serve many missions without reproducing every frontier AI capability.

EU defence research funding should connect successful prototypes to these purchases. Contracts should finance continuous updates, testing and specialist training. Cooperation with Ukrainian developers could bring operational experience into joint development while strengthening Ukraine's industrial capacity. National authorities would retain deployment decisions; the EU would organise the industrial conditions for a stronger European contribution to NATO.

Keep missions under accountable control

European ownership cannot prevent erroneous intelligence. The AI Act excludes systems used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes. Participating defence ministries should therefore make procurement conditional on common assurance requirements: traceable evidence, independent testing against manipulated data, recorded human decisions and effective authority to halt unsafe use. Analysts must be trained to challenge outputs and independently corroborate consequential claims. A human signature cannot substitute for scrutiny.

The strongest objection is that duplicating global supply chains would absorb scarce defence resources and slow adoption. That concern should shape priorities. Europe should retain diversified allied suppliers while building domestic capacity where interruption would prevent critical missions. Joint demand can make those investments viable and reduce national duplication. Inaction also carries costs: interrupted access, dependence on suppliers' decisions and growing difficulty replacing systems embedded in military operations.

The October European Council should request a costed implementation plan from the Commission and European Defence Agency within six months, with participating governments naming initial joint purchases. National procurement budgets and eligible projects under existing EU defence instruments should support initial trials in 2027. Negotiations on the 2028–2034 budget should provide sustained funding, with annual tests of continued operation and recovery after supplier, power or network disruption. Progress should be judged by capabilities delivered and dependencies reduced. Europe's freedom to act must extend from minerals to missions.